Revision by comparison

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.007zbMath1085.03013OpenAlexW1968427399WikidataQ62045363 ScholiaQ62045363MaRDI QIDQ814602

Hans Rott, Eduardo L. Fermé

Publication date: 7 February 2006

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.007

zbMATH Keywords

Belief revisionAGM approachEpistemic entrenchmentIrrefutable revisionIrrevocable revisionIterated revisionNon-prioritized revisionSevere withdrawalSphere semanticsTheory change

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items

Revision by comparison as a unifying framework: Severe withdrawal, irrevocable revision and irrefutable revision, The measurement of ranks and the laws of iterated contraction, Belief revision and computational argumentation: a critical comparison, Filtered belief revision: syntax and semantics, Mixed Iterated Revisions: Rationale, Algorithms, and Complexity, Bounded revision: two-dimensional belief change between conservative and moderate revision, A new psychologism in logic? Reflections from the point of view of belief revision, Believability relations for select-direct sentential revision, AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change, Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators, Remedial interchange, contrary-to-duty obligation and commutation, A Panorama of Iterated Revision, A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states

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