Pollution control in open economies: implications of within-period interactions for dynamic game equilibrium
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Publication:814817
DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0120-3zbMath1122.91059OpenAlexW1997109257MaRDI QIDQ814817
Publication date: 7 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0120-3
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (4)
Transboundary Pollution Abatement, Emission Permits Trading and Compensation Mechanism: A Differential Game Analysis ⋮ Dynamic decision of transboundary basin pollution under emission permits and pollution abatement ⋮ A differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading ⋮ Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly
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