The evolution of cooperation in patent races:Theory and experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0115-0zbMath1132.91512OpenAlexW1966404958MaRDI QIDQ814822

Damiano B. Silipo

Publication date: 7 February 2006

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0115-0

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicspatent raceproduct market collusionresearch joint venture

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Self-reinforcing market dominance

Uses Software

• Reveal
• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Dynamic games of innovation
• Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
• Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
• Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing?
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge
• The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting

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