Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0128-8zbMath1132.91518OpenAlexW3022832119MaRDI QIDQ814831

Hsiao-Chi Chen, Shi-Miin Liu

Publication date: 7 February 2006

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0128-8

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic incentive contractsnon-retrospective penaltyperiodic auditing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

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