Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.004zbMath1122.91031OpenAlexW2097988585MaRDI QIDQ815212

Dan Levin, John H. Kagel

Publication date: 16 February 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentauctionsynergiesexposure problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Survival auctions ⋮ Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs ⋮ Auctions with synergy and resale ⋮ Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Optimal Auction Design
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

This page was built for publication: Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions