Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.011zbMath1122.91021OpenAlexW2152912059MaRDI QIDQ815217

Eduardo Zambrano

Publication date: 16 February 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=econ_fac

zbMATH Keywords

testable implicationsintertemporal decision theory under uncertaintySavage-Bayesian rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty

Cites Work

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• The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
• Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis
• Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs
• Are probabilities used in markets?
• Rationalizability and the savage axioms
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
• Pure Strategy Dominance

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