Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
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Publication:816105
DOI10.1007/S11238-005-6846-0zbMath1125.91400OpenAlexW2042332840MaRDI QIDQ816105
Publication date: 20 February 2006
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5607
Related Items (4)
Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets ⋮ What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
Cites Work
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- On the existence of fair matching algorithms
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- ``Sex-equal stable matchings
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