The egalitarian solution for multichoice games

DOI10.1007/S10479-005-2270-7zbMath1138.91328DBLPjournals/anor/PetersZ05OpenAlexW2080091530WikidataQ58318748 ScholiaQ58318748MaRDI QIDQ816531

Horst Zank, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 9 March 2006

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2270-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (21)

A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games ⋮ Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games ⋮ Multi-choice clan games and their core ⋮ Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application ⋮ The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure ⋮ Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure ⋮ On importance indices in multicriteria decision making ⋮ Dynamic approaches for multichoice solutions ⋮ The construction and characterization of egalitarian solutions for multi-choice NTU games ⋮ The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games ⋮ A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games ⋮ The multichoice coalition value ⋮ POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES ⋮ Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games ⋮ Potential approach and characterizations of a Shapley value in multi-choice games ⋮ Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ The consistent value of fuzzy games ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

Cites Work

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• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• The Shapley value on some lattices of monotonic games
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
• A value for mixed action-set games
• Characterizations of a multi-choice value
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• A value for multichoice games

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