On the design of peer punishment experiments

DOI10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9zbMath1137.91370OpenAlexW2142130929MaRDI QIDQ816752

Marco Casari

Publication date: 23 February 2006

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9

zbMATH Keywords

experimentspublic goodscooperationcommon-pool resourcessanctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (9)

What norms trigger punishment? ⋮ Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment ⋮ The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas ⋮ Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence ⋮ The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action ⋮ Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of fair allocations in a simulated ultimatum game ⋮ Anger management: aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods ⋮ A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments ⋮ Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism: an experimental investigation

Cites Work

• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

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