Joining a queue or staying out: Effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions

DOI10.1007/s10683-005-0872-1zbMath1137.90430OpenAlexW3124389036MaRDI QIDQ816754

Darryl A. Seale, William E. Stein, James E. Parco, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 23 February 2006

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-0872-1

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcoordinationequilibrium solutionbatch queueing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (8)

Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence ⋮ The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs ⋮ Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties ⋮ Choosing a batch to be processed ⋮ Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study ⋮ Managing capacity at a service facility: an experimental approach ⋮ Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions ⋮ A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model

Cites Work

• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
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