Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability

DOI10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6AzbMath1093.03504OpenAlexW2106228439MaRDI QIDQ817230

Antony Eagle

Publication date: 7 March 2006

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/b:erke.0000023408.61887.6a

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Related Items (9)

Carnap on concept determination: methodology for philosophy of science ⋮ Mechanistic probability ⋮ Deterministic probability: Neither chance nor credence ⋮ Propensities and transcendental assumptions ⋮ Explication defended ⋮ On probabilities in biology and physics ⋮ Probability and manipulation: evolution and simulation in applied population genetics ⋮ The propensity interpretation of probability: a re-evaluation ⋮ Probabilities as ratios of ranges in initial-state spaces

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