The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.10.002zbMath1129.91005OpenAlexW2059260651MaRDI QIDQ817262

Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

coreNTU gamesindirect domination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

On the characterizations of viable proposals ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• A property of the core
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• The Core of an N Person Game

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