Approval voting with endogenous candidates

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.010zbMath1129.91014OpenAlexW2107598618MaRDI QIDQ817266

Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingcitizen-candidate modelcomparison of electoral systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (9)

Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms ⋮ Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes ⋮ Weighted approval voting ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ Size approval voting ⋮ Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting ⋮ Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

Cites Work

• Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
• Analyzing a nail-biting election
• Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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