Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.009zbMath1129.91009OpenAlexW2030104131MaRDI QIDQ817269

Robert L. Slonim, Jim Engle-Warnick

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

trustincomplete contractsrepeated gamesexperimental economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (10)

Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games ⋮ Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism ⋮ Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game ⋮ Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence ⋮ Information and learning in oligopoly: an experiment ⋮ Similarities and differences when building trust: the role of cultures ⋮ Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study ⋮ Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach ⋮ An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games ⋮ Limited-trust equilibria

Cites Work

• Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history: A re-examination
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
• Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games

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