Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.001zbMath1129.91010OpenAlexW2076933809MaRDI QIDQ817274

Charles H. Mullin, David H. Reiley

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

experimental statisticssimultaneous-move games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Price floors and competition ⋮ Blowing the whistle ⋮ A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231] ⋮ Corrigendum to ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231] ⋮ Premium auctions in the field ⋮ Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ On recombinant estimation for experimental data ⋮ School choice: an experimental study ⋮ Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence

Cites Work

• Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information
• A Monte Carlo analysis of the Fisher randomization technique: Reviving randomization for experimental economists
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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