Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.001zbMath1129.91322OpenAlexW2063731503MaRDI QIDQ817275

Tibor Neugebauer, Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/49567

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionexperimental economicsbidding theorycomputerized competitorsfirst-price sealed-bid auctionsindependent private value model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (18)

A comparison of first price multi-object auctions ⋮ Multiagent system simulations of treasury auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Regret in auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation ⋮ ON VARIABILITY OF SERIES AND PARALLEL SYSTEMS WITH HETEROGENEOUS COMPONENTS ⋮ Does regret matter in first-price auctions? ⋮ Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions ⋮ Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback ⋮ Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions? ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach ⋮ Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information ⋮ Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals

Uses Software

• RatImage

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Learning direction theory and the winner's curse
• Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
• Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions
• Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes
• Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
• Learning in a laboratory market with random supply and demand
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Price Formation in Single Call Markets

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