The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.08.009zbMath1129.91015OpenAlexW3126053681MaRDI QIDQ817278

Abraham L. Wickelgren

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

exitentry deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (1)

Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant

Cites Work

• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis

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