When and why not to auction

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0558-5zbMath1089.91012OpenAlexW2048868059MaRDI QIDQ818526

Colin M. Campbell, Dan Levin

Publication date: 21 March 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0558-5

zbMATH Keywords

Adverse selection.InterdependenciesPosted prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings ⋮ Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions ⋮ Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets

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