Which is the fairest allocation in the max-min fairness-based coalitional game?

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.07.020OpenAlexW3184401543MaRDI QIDQ820567

Zheng Chen, Yuexuan Wang, Zhaoquan Gu

Publication date: 27 September 2021

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2021.07.020

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamefair allocationenvy-freenessmax-minresource exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

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• A note on cake cutting
• Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
• Models in Cooperative Game Theory
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
• A discrete and bounded envy-free cake cutting protocol for four agents
• Agent incentives of strategic behavior in resource exchange

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