Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
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Publication:823846
DOI10.1007/s13235-020-00359-8zbMath1480.91109OpenAlexW3041074630MaRDI QIDQ823846
Emin Karagözoğlu, Tarık Kara, Elif Özcan-Tok
Publication date: 16 December 2021
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/75411
delaybargaining gamesreference pointsreference-dependent preferencesrecency effectalternating offersretrievability
2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
Cites Work
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