Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110148zbMath1479.91150OpenAlexW3209977837MaRDI QIDQ824032

Haibo Xu, Hong Gao

Publication date: 14 December 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110148

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriadelay in equilibriumendogenous proceduremultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• DECENTRALIZED ONE‐TO‐MANY BARGAINING

This page was built for publication: Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure