On anonymous and weighted voting systems

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09814-3zbMath1479.91107OpenAlexW3158816651MaRDI QIDQ825071

Josep Freixas, Montserrat Pons

Publication date: 17 December 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09814-3

zbMATH Keywords

enumerationsmultichoice gamesdecision-makingpseudo-Boolean functionsanonymous decision systemsweighted decision systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Risk models (general) (91B05)

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