Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:825192
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01342-zzbMath1484.91232OpenAlexW3128191509MaRDI QIDQ825192
Publication date: 17 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Sharing sequential values in a network
- Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
- Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
- Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
This page was built for publication: Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
