A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict

DOI10.3934/krm.2021014zbMath1492.91239arXiv2006.01265OpenAlexW3137377119MaRDI QIDQ826032

Mikhail Perepelitsa

Publication date: 18 December 2021

Published in: Kinetic and Related Models (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.01265

zbMATH Keywords

Fokker-Planck equationlearning in gamescultural evolutionkinetic models in population dynamicsmulti-agent game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Fokker-Planck equations (35Q84) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16)

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