Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
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Publication:826040
DOI10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5zbMath1483.91099OpenAlexW3096895672MaRDI QIDQ826040
Publication date: 18 December 2021
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00240-5
Cites Work
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy
- Bargaining and negative externalities
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- When and why not to auction
- Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Optimal Auction Design
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