All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
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Publication:826042
DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00242-3zbMath1477.91026OpenAlexW3120316509MaRDI QIDQ826042
Publication date: 18 December 2021
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3
revenue rankingall-pay auctionsecond-price auctionfirst-price auctionmultidimensional signalsprivate signals
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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Cites Work
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