Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01245-3zbMath1454.91088OpenAlexW2756653073MaRDI QIDQ826606

Panos Protopapas, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 6 January 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hec.unil.ch/attachments/deep/series/2016/17.13.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferencespopulation-monotonicityreplacement-dominancetarget point functionstarget set correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (3)

On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle ⋮ Generalized target functions on trees

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