Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01252-4zbMath1454.91142OpenAlexW3018694585MaRDI QIDQ826612

Umut Mert Dur, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 6 January 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01252-4

zbMATH Keywords

constrained stabilitytwo-sided matching marketsworker-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

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