The importance of expertise in group decisions
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Publication:826614
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01253-3zbMath1457.91152OpenAlexW3020515730MaRDI QIDQ826614
Publication date: 6 January 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01253-3
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