Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model

DOI10.1007/s00712-020-00709-5zbMath1468.91102OpenAlexW3043399871MaRDI QIDQ826655

Zheng Wang, John S. Heywood

Publication date: 6 January 2021

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00709-5

zbMATH Keywords

collusionsocial welfarespatial price discriminationelastic demandBertrand competitioncarteltransport costinelastic demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (1)

Common ownership in a delivered pricing duopoly

Cites Work

• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model
• Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location
• Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
• A SPATIAL MODEL OF CARTEL STABILITY: THE INFLUENCE OF PRODUCTION COST CONVEXITY

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