Price-coupling games and the generation expansion planning problem
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Publication:827267
DOI10.1007/S10479-020-03687-5zbMath1455.91063arXiv1901.01927OpenAlexW3038520194MaRDI QIDQ827267
Ankur A. Kulkarni, Mathew P. Abraham
Publication date: 7 January 2021
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.01927
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
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Cites Work
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