Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
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Publication:827706
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2020.110423zbMath1455.91091OpenAlexW3045191704WikidataQ98162280 ScholiaQ98162280MaRDI QIDQ827706
Marta C. Couto, Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco
Publication date: 13 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110423
Related Items (5)
Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism ⋮ Evolutionary games and applications: fifty years of `the logic of animal conflict' ⋮ Replicator dynamics for involution in an infinite well-mixed population ⋮ Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment ⋮ Mercenary punishment in structured populations
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