Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium in the linear city model

DOI10.1134/S0005117920020137zbMath1455.91155OpenAlexW3011183672MaRDI QIDQ827925

S. V. Melnikov

Publication date: 14 January 2021

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117920020137

zbMATH Keywords

transcritical bifurcationdifferentiationagglomerationlinear cityStackelberg information asymmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Bifurcations in context of PDEs (35B32)

Cites Work

• Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
• On Hotelling's competition with non-uniform customer distributions
• Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right
• Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case
• Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• LOCATION GAME ON THE PLANE
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