On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
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Publication:828741
DOI10.1007/s11750-020-00553-2zbMath1461.91016OpenAlexW3013249975MaRDI QIDQ828741
J. C. Gonçalves-Dosantos, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, José M. Alonso-Meijide, Julián Costa
Publication date: 5 May 2021
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-020-00553-2
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (5)
New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions ⋮ On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures ⋮ Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ Necessary players and values
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