On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions

DOI10.1007/s11750-020-00553-2zbMath1461.91016OpenAlexW3013249975MaRDI QIDQ828741

J. C. Gonçalves-Dosantos, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, José M. Alonso-Meijide, Julián Costa

Publication date: 5 May 2021

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-020-00553-2

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesa priori unionsequal division valueequal surplus division value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions ⋮ On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures ⋮ Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ Necessary players and values

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