On the characterizations of viable proposals

DOI10.1007/S11238-020-09762-4zbMath1460.91023OpenAlexW3033262254MaRDI QIDQ829480

Yi-You Yang

Publication date: 6 May 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09762-4

zbMATH Keywords

coalition structure coreaccessible proposalminimal dominant setundominated proposalviable proposal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
• On the number of blocks required to access the core
• Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• On the accessibility of core-extensions
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• On the accessibility of the core
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A property of the core
• An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Viable Proposals

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