Special issue on ambiguity and strategic interactions in honor of Jürgen Eichberger
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Publication:829495
DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09807-2zbMath1459.00014OpenAlexW3145185405MaRDI QIDQ829495
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Publication date: 6 May 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09807-2
Decision theory (91B06) Collections of articles of miscellaneous specific interest (00B15) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Festschriften (00B30)
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