Persuasion under ambiguity

DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09764-2zbMath1461.91093OpenAlexW3038185405MaRDI QIDQ829506

T. Florian Kauffeldt, Jonas Hedlund, Malte Lammert

Publication date: 6 May 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09764-2

zbMATH Keywords

signalingambiguityinformation transmissionpersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION

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