Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00337-9zbMath1461.91063OpenAlexW2983341057WikidataQ126807509 ScholiaQ126807509MaRDI QIDQ831075

Shan Sun, Joshua Safley, Jan Rychtář

Publication date: 10 May 2021

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00337-9

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryhandicap principledishonest signallingindex hypothesispygmalion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game

Cites Work

• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Perceptual advertisement by the prey of stalking or ambushing predators
• Evolutionarily stable defence and signalling of that defence
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals

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