Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment

DOI10.1007/s13235-019-00339-7zbMath1461.91046OpenAlexW2989963832MaRDI QIDQ831077

Xiaojie Chen, Linjie Liu, Qiang Wang

Publication date: 10 May 2021

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00339-7

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationreplicator equationsindividual disguisepeer punishmentstochastic evolutionary dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Rational conformity behavior in social learning promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise ⋮ Analysis of dynamic evolution process of the N-player division of labor game model ⋮ Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games ⋮ Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game ⋮ Replicator dynamics for involution in an infinite well-mixed population

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