Mechanisms for (mis)allocating scientific credit

DOI10.1007/s00453-021-00902-yOpenAlexW4205994695MaRDI QIDQ832517

Sigal Oren, Jon M. Kleinberg

Publication date: 25 March 2022

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-021-00902-y

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchyalgorithmic game theorycredit allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx) Graph theory (05Cxx)

Cites Work

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• The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
• (Incremental) priority algorithms
• Potential games
• Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
• Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy

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