On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions
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Publication:834453
DOI10.1016/j.fss.2007.06.015zbMath1168.91347OpenAlexW1991422934MaRDI QIDQ834453
Fouad Ben Abdelaziz, Olfa Meddeb, José Rui Figueira
Publication date: 26 August 2009
Published in: Fuzzy Sets and Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2007.06.015
Related Items (5)
Arrow-type results under fuzzy preferences based on filter and ultrafilter ⋮ Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences ⋮ Fuzzy Arrow-type results without the Pareto principle based on fuzzy pre-orders ⋮ FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE ⋮ INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND FUZZY ARROW'S THEOREM
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