On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions

DOI10.1016/j.fss.2007.06.015zbMath1168.91347OpenAlexW1991422934MaRDI QIDQ834453

Fouad Ben Abdelaziz, Olfa Meddeb, José Rui Figueira

Publication date: 26 August 2009

Published in: Fuzzy Sets and Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2007.06.015

zbMATH Keywords

fuzzy preference relationsfuzzy social choice functionsfuzzy strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Arrow-type results under fuzzy preferences based on filter and ultrafilter ⋮ Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences ⋮ Fuzzy Arrow-type results without the Pareto principle based on fuzzy pre-orders ⋮ FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE ⋮ INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND FUZZY ARROW'S THEOREM

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Additive decomposition of fuzzy pre-orders
• Exact choice and fuzzy preferences
• Fuzzy preferences and social choice
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• On choosing rationally when preferences are fuzzy
• Fuzzy preference and Orlovsky choice procedure
• Transitivity and fuzzy preferences.
• Interrelationships among fuzzy preference-based choice functions and significance of rationality conditions: a taxonomic and intuitive perspective.
• Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: some characterizations
• Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: some rules of the mean
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Quantitative fuzzy semantics
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

This page was built for publication: On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions