Congestion games with malicious players

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.017zbMath1173.91301OpenAlexW2119603406MaRDI QIDQ834852

Moshe Babaioff, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.017

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcongestion gamesselfish routingmalicious behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (12)

Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism ⋮ Information diffusion in social sensing ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Graphical congestion games ⋮ Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games ⋮ Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure ⋮ Fault tolerance in large games ⋮ Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games ⋮ “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games ⋮ Adversarial behavior in network games

Cites Work

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• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Fast convergence to Wardrop equilibria by adaptive sampling methods
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• When selfish meets evil
• Algorithms and Computation
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points

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