Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.06.007zbMath1168.91367OpenAlexW2027062276MaRDI QIDQ834856

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

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• Derandomization of auctions
• Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions

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