Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
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Publication:834857
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.08.001zbMath1168.90454OpenAlexW2068852191MaRDI QIDQ834857
Publication date: 27 August 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.105.5034
Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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