Beyond Moulin mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:834858
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.005zbMath1168.91314OpenAlexW2078184776MaRDI QIDQ834858
Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan
Publication date: 27 August 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.005
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