The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.11.004zbMath1173.91016OpenAlexW1997396773MaRDI QIDQ834876

Jay Surti, Yuk-fai Fong

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumprisoner's dilemmainfinitely repeated gamesside payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side: The Case of Different Discount Factors
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Why to buy your darling flowers: On cooperation and exploitation

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