Coincident cost improvement vs. Degradation by adding connections to noncooperative networks and distributed systems
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Publication:836011
DOI10.1007/s11067-009-9102-2zbMath1170.90333OpenAlexW2064749998MaRDI QIDQ836011
Publication date: 31 August 2009
Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-009-9102-2
Nash equilibriumnetwork routingcomputer networksBraess paradoxdistributed computer systemsnoncooperative optimizationstatic load balancingwardrop equilibrium
Related Items (4)
The classical Braess paradox problem revisited: a generalized inverse method on non-unique path flow cases ⋮ Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers ⋮ EFFECTS OF SYMMETRY ON GLOBALIZING SEPARATED MONOPOLIES TO A NASH-COURNOT OLIGOPOLY ⋮ Congestion control for a system with parallel stations and homogeneous customers using priority passes
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