Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0395-zzbMath1180.91173OpenAlexW2057258689MaRDI QIDQ836879

Helmut Bester

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13481/

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractstheory of the firmimperfect informationexternalitiesauthoritydecision rights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Optimal sequential delegation ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights

Cites Work

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