Robust rational turnout

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0396-yzbMath1185.91078OpenAlexW2136372871MaRDI QIDQ836880

Tasos Kalandrakis

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0396-y

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationvoting gameparticipation gameregular Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Public information and electoral bias
• The calculus of ethical voting
• Welfare reducing polls
• On participation games with complete information
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem.
• On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Some Results for Discrete Unimodality

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