Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
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Publication:836921
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0363-3zbMath1190.91008OpenAlexW2119115177MaRDI QIDQ836921
Publication date: 9 September 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0363-3
Cites Work
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